Dr. Judy Wood solved the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster 5 months before NASA did! by @mes on 3Speak
In this video, I show how Dr. Judy Wood worked out what caused the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster within days, while NASA only confirmed it about 5 months later. Watching the live coverage on Febr...
Tags: #math #science #engineering #scifimultiverse #physics #columbia #nasa #chessbrothers #threespeak
And now that we were done all, pretty much a solution there, and I'm going to go over some extracurricular activities right here, and the next part is, the next section here is going to be, well, this one is Dr. Judy Wood solved the space shuttle Columbia disaster right away, maybe even have been the first person. So Dr. Judy Wood gave this test to her EM or Mechanics of Engineering, I mean mechanics and materials 3.04 class, just five days after the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster, and months later, NASA officially came to the same conclusion. Again, it was quite fascinating stuff there from The Doctor. So here is a Gemini AI summary of emails that Dr. Judy would send me regarding how she rapidly analyzed and solved the failure mechanism. And again, AI is just much easier than having me to do this. manually and so on, but yeah, this pretty much is the gist of it, and so on. So, identifying the thermal tile issue. So following the disintegration of the Space Shuttle Columbia on February 1st, 2003, Dr. Wood watched a liftoff footage on television and analyzed the foam strike. She noticed that the foam made a right angle turn, end quote, dustified upon impact, indicating it was a hard, significant hit rather than a light grazing. And yeah, you saw that in that footage. All right, and here, just teleported back to that earlier video I showed. This is the debris strike on January 16, 2003, basically during launch, and we'll play this right here. So the first angles, the one that Dr. Judy Wood saw on TV during the disaster, they would show it over and over again. So this enhanced side view, the video footage of the foam strike to Columbia's left wing, 81.9 seconds after liftoff from camera E212. So here this one is pretty clear that it's 90 degree... strike right here, I'm gonna go fast for it, okay, it's right here. So there's a debris coming off, that's actually the foam insulation, and it hits this, and it's pretty strong on there. Notice how much dust comes off that, so literally turns to dust there, dustifies us, the doctor would say. So if you see right here, I'm gonna play it slow motion, actually. Let's see how slow we could play it. Okay, so there's, I'm gonna play a bit slower. Yeah, okay, so it's gonna go, I'll shoot, yeah, it's going, I'm gonna go frame by frame. Let's go back right here. Yeah, so there it is. You can see that debris there. Yeah, so it's going like this. Yeah, there's a debris. And then it's going to strike this, and then literally right angle on the left, hits it, and then right angle. And then it goes, yeah, so it's literally right angle, especially with a good thing, but these are going super, super fast. So then that's going to be, in order for it to even go to these side, it's going to be extremely fast going there. It's pretty wild. stuff there and then yeah so uh and then they were flying for a couple weeks for that and now here's the second angle this one that's E208 uh dr judy wood said so she actually saw this angle first time ever when i showed her it so this isn't as clear but it shows at least the the wing i'm just gonna play this one uh so here so here's one it's it's hard to see so there's a little thing in and it dustifies there yeah so that there's one there yeah so it's a bit small and you can see it in hits and It's hard to see, but it's pretty straightforward. Yeah, this one looks like that. This one shows this angle. The other one is a more, yeah, a higher definition. This is from further on. But yeah, this is pretty straightforward stuff. So basically, if this happens, you gotta get some splice satellites zoom in and get some confirmation that this is, you know, the damage isn't as extreme as it appears from just from this setup here. And the question is, why did NASA have... HD photo photos ready while it's flying for a couple weeks after this and so on. And yeah, notice also how much dust it turns into. So basically she noticed that the foam strike made a right angle turn and dust fight upon impact. Yeah, basically it hit... It hit then went outwards, so it was like almost a direct impact. It wasn't just like a slight grazing. So indicating it was a hard, significant hit rather than a light grazing. Recognizing the necessity of thermal tiles during re -entry to manage thermal expansion, she correctly deduced the exact location of the wing damage. The February 6, 2003 test, just five days after the disaster, Dr. Wood incorporated the real-world event into her EM 304 or Mechanics and Materials exam on February 6, 2003. The test required students to calculate stresses, thermal expansion, and the failure temperature for the exposed aluminum substructure. And to help students grasp concepts like sheer stress versus normal stress, she famously used visual aids in her classes, including Roadrunner cartoons, such as the Coyote or Wiley E. Coyote cutting a circular disc out of a bridge to teach how to identify the correct surface area. And yeah, I just had to link to that video. It was pretty epic video. It took me well find that to ask Grog AI to find this one. So if I go over here at the 224 mark, here's Acme Birdseed, watch this right here. Alright, yeah, so he's underneath and he cuts it, and yeah, he falls, all right, pretty epic stuff there. And again, it's to show the importance of identifying the correct surface area, and this is actually relevant in our section here, because basically, yeah, to identify the surface area around this, so that's that circular... perimeter times by the thickness versus these, all these ones have basically the compressive area there. And again, we had to use it over here, and that's how we obtained that. So it's, again, very, very important stuff there. All right, and now here is another note here. So around half of her students solved it completely, though many initially doubted their calculations because the resulting failure temperature, roughly 205 degrees, Fahrenheit, seemed surprisingly low, especially because remember the Some parts of that space shuttle are actually going to, like, close to 3,000 degrees Fahrenheit, like, in the nose or in a front or whatever, it's coming in. So that's pretty low there. 205. All right, so NASA's timeline to the same conclusion. So it took NASA two months following the disaster upon analyzing flight data recorder equivalent thermal couple data, too. And then Gemini actually had this written to officially update and confirm the exact... failure location on the wing. This is actually wrong. The doctor corrected me on this. It was actually two months, basically, to focus their investigation on the left wing, and then five months later, total, in July, until they got experimental confirmation of the extensive damage caused by the foam strike. or I'll just say a phlegal strike, because that was part of the experiment. Matching the conclusion, Dr. Wood had already mapped out for her student's exam, like literally, yes, five days after, but then she knew this basically right away during the disaster, which she was doing her calculations, just realizing this is a pretty strong hit. It was like 90-degree hit, and that dust all that coming off of it, that's pretty extensive. So, yeah, her doing the calculations and then concluded already the 205 degrees and so on. Other notable details, The Disaster Queen, yeah, this is her nickname that she was given by her student. So Dr. Wood was known by this nickname for her ability to analyze structural failures and apply them to coursework. And NASA's internal awareness and cover-up, she noted that NASA management was aware of the foam strike early on and even discussed launching a, quote, care package of supplies to the space station that could have been redirected to the shuttle, but chose not to inform the crew of the serious danger. Furthermore, multiple requests by outside groups for spy satellite imaging of the wing were cancelled by higher-ups, and then experimental validation. Months later, Columbia Accident Investigation Board CAIB, Investigator G. Scott Hubbard conducted physical tests, first on a fiber-class rehearsal wing, and then on a real shuttle wing that successfully replicated the exact damage pattern. Alright, and here I quickly teleported back here. So there is that original video is showed where it shows the foam strike, but then at the second part of it, it shows the investigation process. So the following two videos were taken July 7, 2003 during the investigation process in cooperation with the Southeast or Southwest Research Institute. A one pound block of foam insulation is fired into panel 8 of the reinforced carbon carbon panel that provided heating protection of the shuttle's left wing. The foam block is fired at the carbon panel at 500 miles an hour. So fascinating stuff, so pretty hard there. So yeah, basically, anything you're firing at 500 miles an hour, yeah, it can do some damage there. All right, let's go here. And yeah, so it launches there, but again, it itself turns to pretty much dust there. So there's the foam at 500 miles now, but now it's slow motion is July 7, 2003. Let's play here. So it's, it's almost like a direct hit, yeah. So it hits it like that, and it pretty much explodes, and there's the explosion there. Yeah, it hits and explodes. Pretty fascinating stuff there. Let's see what else happens in here. Here's another angle, okay? Yeah, this is from inside. and yeah, it's pretty damage, and NASA just was okay with us, like, flying around for, like, weeks. And there's inside, again, I'm making double speed right now, I'm going to make it a bit faster, okay, let's speed it up and see what else is in here. Is there anything else in here? Okay, in age when spaceflight has come to seem almost routine, it is easy to overlook the dangers, why is it so hard to read? Okay. Alright here, I just moved it over there. Yes, so in an age when spaceflight has come to seem almost routine, it is easy to overlook the dangers of travel by rocket and the difficulties of navigating the fierce outer atmosphere of the earth. These astronauts knew the dangers and they faced them willingly knowing they had a high and noble purpose in life because of their courage and we, and daring and idealism. All right, and we'll miss them all the more. This is, oh, President George Bush said on February 1st. Holy, the material on this video is property of the National Space Aeronautics and Space Administration and Columbia Accident Investigation Board. For more information, visit the CAIBC at the website, CAIB.NASA.G, so fastening setup there. Yeah, so, yeah, so it basically confirms it. And going further, here's one of the slides from Scott Hubbard's Investigation Board, the investigation that Dr. Judy would include it in her test problem PDF that you send me, or PDF. that she sent me. I'm not sure if she included that in her thing. Maybe she included to her students later. But here, she gave me this, the link here, but this C-A-I-B-U -S, but that doesn't work anymore. I found an archive, but the archive doesn't show the images. It just shows everything, but not their images. Here's an alternative link, GovInfo.Library.unt.edu, and you can click that, and you can go over to the slides. So here is the slide that she showed. right here, so debris impact, new calculations, so footprint of impact, so this is the left wing, you see this is the landing gear, so that's the tire is going to be around here, so that's going to be on the left side, yeah, and yeah, that's left wings underneath it. So a new computed trajectory, yes, it's not 100% right angle, but it's still pretty hard on there, especially because it's curved a bit, so it's like that angle, straight on it. and a footprint of attack, close-up panels, and this presentation slide 3 by G. Scott Hubbard on April 15, 2003. And note the landing gear door showing the damage, yeah, landing gear door right here, showing the damages to the left wing, exactly where Dr. Judy would point it out. And then now here's, if you go into another slide, in slide 4, the next one, on his, that same presentation, and I'll open up this so you can see. Alright, so here's it is, here's a full CAIV press briefing by Scott Hubbard there, and you can read the whole thing, and so on, it's all talking about the left wing, left wing, left wing, there's, and they have some imagery of that, and so once you can go and play around it, eroded to knife edge, is interesting. Anyways, fascinating stuff there. Yeah, going back to here, so now this one's an interesting one here, so now there's two sections here, temperature chart here, this is the left wing, there's the landing gear. And now just a quick note right here, this is indeed the left wing. In my first recording, I thought this was the right wing. I thought this was basically from the bottom view, because there's a landing gear. But no, that's actually the left wing. So I know that the image above is indeed of the left wing, as illustrated below. Here's a video that shows it on the left wing, and also on over here. You can see the landing gear just to show that where it is, where the landing gear is. It's getting the wheels on the wings are... pretty thin and pretty close to the landing gear, because it's all pretty compact, but yeah, that is the left wing indeed. All right, so anyway, so here's the chart here. Dr. Judy Wood drew this line in there. The original doesn't have this red line there. But yeah, you can see that temperature at these two zones. This is the red one here. So as it's like fine, Alveson, there's that re-entry is increasing. And now you can see this giant spike and goes back down. So this is, yeah, where everything pretty much blew up roughly there. And there's the blue one got a bit hotter. This one has spiked a bit hotter. But notice how, yeah, this is the exact failure, is like literally the 200 degrees Fahrenheit zone. Unbelievable. So here's a GROC AI explanation for the above chart, since it doesn't come with any tech, so I'm just going to go over it, but it seems pretty reasonable. So this chart shows temperature data from sensors near reinforced carbon carbon, or RCC panel 9 on the left wing, leading edge of Columbia STS 107. During re-entry. It is from G. Scott Hubbard's April 15, 2003, CAI, B presentation. The graph plus temperature degrees Fahrenheit versus seconds from entry interface, EI, so seconds from entry interface, there's Fahrenheit, and the two lines correspond to the different sensors in the panel region, shown in the small diagram at upper right, so sensor, this one is panel nine there, and then there's the blue and there's the red sensor locations. One line, typically the lower, yeah, typically the lower bluish traces from a sensor that starts colder around 100, yet it starts around negative 100 degrees Fahrenheit. The other red brown starts at near 0 to 20 degrees Fahrenheit. So again, that's what she said initially starts off from, so around 0. And yeah, so this one's around 0, that's internal one. This one's on the outside, and that's going up because you're coming in from space, so it's going to be colder there. And so much is fascinating. and then it spikes up. Let's see what it says here. All right, there are internal sensors, spar and clevis area behind slash rear the RCC panels, not external surface temperatures. I mean, these are internal sensors. They're inside, they're not on the outside, not external temperature services. Normal reentry temperatures for these locations rise only modestly. Yeah, so they shouldn't rise much. So these are internal, these aren't on the surface. These are inside there. So their internal surface. I'll put this right here, internal sensors, not on the surface, not external surface temperatures. What the spike means, around AI, so seconds from entry interface, EI plus 480 to 520 seconds, both traces rise sharply, one climbs rapidly past roughly 200 degrees Fahrenheit, and goes off scale, the sensor range tops out around 450 degrees Fahrenheit, then both drop off scale, yellow. So basically, at this area, it basically just spikes up, and now it goes back down and see what happens there. All right, this does not mean the vehicle broke up at that instant. Columbia continued flying for several more minutes. Loss of signal occurred near EI plus 900 seconds, so basically 400 more seconds, and it was still had signal. And then it lost it after. The spike and subsequent sensor failure indicate that the superheated plasma had entered the wing through a breach in the leading edge thermal. protection system and was heating the internal structure and wiring. The sensors or their wires were destroyed by the heat. Exactly the, quote, wires cut or burned through behavior Hubbard described in the briefing. Later, CAIB analyzed, analysis identified the breach as originating near RCC panels 8-9, again where Dr. Judy Wood pointed out, from the foam strike during ascent, the temperature data were one of the early lines of evidence pointing to heating inside the wing well before breakup. Judy's 2005 Fahrenheit annotation. In her exam material, she marks the rising portion of the red trace near 205 degrees Fahrenheit. That number is the failure temperature. She calculated in the exam problem for the aluminum stiffener under constrained... thermal expansion, sheer failure at the plate connection, she is drawing a direct visual link between the real flight data and the temperature her idealized two problem predicted would cause structural failure. In short, the chart shows the moment hot gas entered the wing and began destroying sensors near panel 9. The spike marks the onset of that internal heating event, not the final breakup, and Judy highlighted a 205 degrees Fahrenheit level to connected to her thermal stress calculations. Again, absolutely. Fastening stuff.